In the latter part of the 20th century, the use of nuclear weapons was essential to sustaining international stability[1]. Despite enormous developments in communications, transportation, and military technology, there haven’t been any serious strategic wars since the Second World War. Nuclear weapons, the most destructive instruments ever made, contributed to the stabilization of superpower relations by increasing the cost of conflict.[2] However, owing to changes in geopolitics and improvements in military technology, the makeup of our nuclear forces and our use of them may alter in the twenty-first century. The time has arrived for a thorough reevaluation of what we want and require from these specialized weapons[3].
Nuclear warfare is one component of a complete defensive strategy that also includes conventional forces and diplomacy. The principal goal of nuclear weapons has always been and continues to be to deter potential foes from attacking the US or its vital interests. This viewpoint is expected to remain in effect as long as nuclear weapons are regarded as the “”warfare equipment.” “ultimate weapon. This does not necessarily mean that they will play the same role in military strategy going forward. Due to shifts in the geopolitical environment and the unrelenting advancement of military technology both domestically and abroad, the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy is expected to vary over time. [4]Given the unique destructive power of nuclear weapons, it is essential that this development be planned, to the extent that is practical, with careful consideration of the integration of strategic nuclear forces into a cohesive and comprehensive strategy for national security.
Despite the major changes in the world over the last 10 years, nuclear war preparation today is still remarkably similar to that of the Cold War. The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is focused on a comprehensive retaliation strategy to stop an adversary from further hurting American objectives. Nuclear weapons give an assured retaliatory capacity to convince any opponent that aggression or coercion would result in a reprisal that would be certain, overwhelming, and catastrophic. The idea that nuclear weapons would only be used in extreme cases and when the nation was in grave danger is not widely embraced. Although the subject of lone weapons has been raised “The emphasis of nuclear strategy has been and is on massive battles as opposed to strikes on single targets like WMD installations. This may not be accurate in the future. The advancement of technology for conventional weapons might allow them to perform some of the functions now carried out by nuclear bombs. As an illustration, consider a road-mobile ballistic missile. If the location of such a target is known and a conventional weapon can be shot at it with meters-scale accuracy, it may be destroyed without the need of a nuclear bomb. On the other hand, if one does not
[1] Gavin, Francis J. “Nuclear Statecraft.” Nuclear Statecraft. Cornell University Press, 2012.
[2] Cirincione, Joseph. Bomb scare: the history and future of nuclear weapons. Columbia University Press, 2007.
[3] Mueller, John. “The essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons: Stability in the postwar world.” International Security 13.2 (1988): 55-79.
[4] Chakma, Bhumitra. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Routledge, 2012.
know the target’s location to within a few kilometers, even a nuclear bomb may not be able to destroy it. The prerequisites for target destruction are not intelligence and precision delivery, but rather intelligence and explosive strength of the weapon. However, reliance on conventional weapons with limited radii of devastation is compounded by countermeasures as basic as steel netting, boulder fields, or decoys, even if a weapon is precisely delivered to the intended target location.
The role of nuclear weapons as the greatest deterrent to aggression and the ultimate destructive power in conflict makes the maintenance of at least some nuclear forces for many years to come plausible. Nevertheless, due to altering conditions, changing military demands, and changed opinions on our ability to maintain credible nuclear forces without conducting nuclear tests or creating a lot of weapons, the composition of our nuclear arsenal may dramatically change. Options for accurately delivering nuclear weapons could reduce the need for high yield. Alterations to existing weapons designs could also be used to create lower yield weapons.[5]
Conventional weapons may be able to perform some of the functions now performed by nuclear bombs, but not all of them. Certain targets, like as command and control centers and missile silos, are so hard to destroy with a conventional weapon[6]. Other targets, such naval and aircraft sites, would need an enormous amount of conventional explosives to detonate since they are so far apart. Even if conventional weapons are capable of hurting or destroying such objects, doing so now requires using up limited resources that could be better used elsewhere. Future designs of conventional weapons might change the limitations on the amount of damage that can be caused by a given quantity of high explosive. Nuclear weapons are expected to remain a part of strategic doctrine for these and other reasons, notwithstanding their usefulness as a psychological deterrent to aggression.[7] We don’t explicitly threaten cities or individuals, as in a countervalue plan, even if there is an implied risk of doing so that is a potent part of the deterrence calculus. American nuclear weapons systems are designed to use the least amount of explosive force necessary to achieve the desired result while posing a threat to certain target classes. However, one important factor dictating the explosive force required to defeat a target of a certain hardness is the precision with which weapons can be delivered.[8] The development of precision delivery technologies might change how nuclear weapons attack targets, perhaps reducing or even eliminating the need for an explosion in certain situations[9]. Once again, using conventional weapons assumes a level of in-depth familiarity with the location and features of the target that has eluded military planners so far[10]. Certain strategic operations that depend on conventional precision bombs need a substantial investment in data collection and processing systems, including accurate techniques for estimating target damage after an attack[11]. This is essential for strategic targets like mobile missiles or WMDs because, if they survive, they might do considerable damage.
[5] Chakma, Bhumitra. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Routledge, 2012.
[6] Waltz, Kenneth N. “Nuclear myths and political realities.” American Political Science Review 84.3 (1990): 730-745.
[7] Sagan, Scott D. “The causes of nuclear weapons proliferation.” Annual Review of Political Science 14.1 (2011): 225-244.
[8] Singh, Jaswant. “Against nuclear apartheid.” Foreign Aff. 77 (1998): 41.
[9] Jackson, Robert J. Global politics in the 21st century. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
[10] Bertonha, João Fábio. “Brazil: an emerging military power? The problem of the use of force in Brazilian international relations in the 21st century.” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (2010): 107-124.
[11] Sagan, Scott D. “The causes of nuclear weapons proliferation.” Annual Review of Political Science 14.1 (2011): 225-244.
